The future of youth is old age, and beyond. My aim here is not to forecast the social conditions for entry into the future labor market, in the 2020s say, but rather to analyze the consequences of contemporary problems (the scarcity of jobs, unemployment, the stagnation of wages, and so on) for the life chances of youth. I also analyze the first cohorts of adults socialized in the economic slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s to understand the long-term consequences of the crise. This essay therefore focuses on the consequences of the (des)integration of youth in France in the context of mass unemployment and déclassement scolaire (over-education and diploma inflation). This French experience is interesting in itself.
aged insiders and young outsiders and where young adults lack resilience in facing early career difficulties.
We examine the concept of "social generation" in relation to the distribution of wellbeing and life chances, and we seek to understand how the French welfare regime can be undermined over the long-term by an unbalanced distribution of social benefits when the young become the first victims of economic downturns. The French case is marked by strong generational imbalances: as I will show, on account of the shift from the economic boom period of the trente glorieuses (from 1945 to 1975) to the era of croissance ralentie (slow growth from 1975 to today), a generational rift (fracture générationnelle) emerged between the generations born before 1955 (the early baby boom generations and the previous ones, who benefited most from the economic acceleration of the postwar period) and those born after 1955 (who were victims of economic slowdown, high youth unemployment, and the social problems that came as a consequence). This fracturing entails, too, an "insiderization" of previous generations (socialized in the period of economic expansion) and an "outsiderization" of new ones. This fracture générationnelle is often denied by policymakers and in the public debate; 4 however, the long-term implications of these generational dynamics may have major consequences for the stability of our welfare state. International comparison provides some useful benchmarks in this respect. Scarring effects and of the lack of resilience to early adulthood career setbacks appear to be more extreme in France, but they are occurring in a number of other countries as well.
value, whereas mass universities (including the many campuses of the University of Paris, and even the Sorbonne) produce legions of educational déclassés. As a third constraint, the process of social attainment is concentrated in time, and any early mismatch between one's diploma and one's early post-graduation social position has huge consequences in terms of long-term life course in the labor market.
As a result of these constraints, we can observe a fragmentation of youth along three dimensions. The first dimension is age fragmentation: economic dependence in "first youth," before age twenty-five, is generally accepted, but it takes on a negative connotation during "second youth" (until age thirty), and for "third youth" (after thirty) it creates shame for the parents and a feeling of failure for the young.
The second dimension is family solidarity. Whereas in the 1970s in France, family support was quite neutral in its effect on status attainment (average wages, even at age twenty-five, were sufficient to cover the housing costs of standard young families), the economic resources of parents and their generosity are now crucial for young people. Youth with similar earnings and from similar social milieus may have starkly different standards of living depending on whether they receive help from families for childcare, housing, access to a mortgage, and the like.
The third dimension is type of education and social context. At the top of the French social structure, elite grandes écoles alumni have experienced no strong transformation of their social status over the last forty years. Their transition from school to work is still fast and linear. Their couple and family formation process differs little from the experience of their predecessors in the 1970s. Family support is not crucial for these elite graduates, since independence in the stable job market is generally taken for granted. Gender differentiation is weaker than in other social groups, and is declining, even if women are more often oriented to the public sector and to skilled welfare jobs, and men to well-paid segments of the private sector. By contrast, the least educated strata 8 is subject to extraordinary risks of unemployment. Youth of working-class origin leave school at an average age of seventeen and begin to acquire some stability in employment at age twenty-five or later, and gender differentiation is strong. This means that in working-class milieus, the average age when a son or daughter finds economic independence and leaves the parental home is higher than in highly-educated families, where youth usually leave home before gaining a bachelor's degree.
Between the end of school and the beginning of stable employment (when it happens) less well-off young people experience a long period of leisure with few economic resources: they make up a stratum of money-poor and time-rich youth. In this group, ethnic minorities are overrepresented but are not the majority. Most participants to the 2005 riots came from this stratum and were either members of the "first youth" generation or elder "second youth" working-class sons who lacked a means of political or collective expression. 9 They had neither social visibility nor political commitment. If youth from this strata lack lack family support, they most likely feel a keen sense of exclusion. For young people with moderately levels of education, the situation is even more complicated since social perspectives depend on specific factors, such as type of education (liberal arts versus marketable knowledge), the extent of potential family support, social capital, and the acquaintances parents have at their disposal. A tradition of entrepreneurship can have a dramatic effect. Today in France, moderately-educated youth from unpropertied families (the public-sector middle class, for instance) experience a high risk of economic marginalization when they fail to penetrate the public-sector employment system, where jobs are now scarce, or when they enter the informal art, culture, media and journalistic sector. This social context can be explained to some extent by using the "diamantine scheme" of the French social class system. The scheme combines Pierre Bourdieu's conception of social space with Robert Perrucci and Earl Wysong "double diamond" class structure. 11 The various elements of this diamantine scheme might move upward or downward, enlarge or diminish, and separate or agglomerate with neighboring categories. For instance, the left corner of "educationally déclassés" (over-educated poor) is much larger today than thirty years ago, when the public sector expanded to such an extent that it could absorb the moderately-educated youth of the early 1980s. Conversely, the "nouveau riche"
corner on the right side of the scheme was small and marginal in the 1980s but has since would depict the emergence in the recent period of a paradoxical generation defined by its lack of own identity, a lack that is precisely the source of its identity. This picture has strong empirical bases: whereas French youth of the 1970s gave the impression of embracing a cultural and political unity against the conservative right-wing governments and the cultural symbols of former social generations (notably the generation of the Résistance, the fiftysomething age group of 1968), today's youth have developed no strong cultural or political symbols of identification with which to create an apparent unity to disguise its obvious and increasing diversity. Hence we need to probe more deeply, beyond the level of cultural and political expression, to see the forces at work in social generation formation in France today.
The Multidimensional fracture générationnelle in France
The economic slowdown in France has provoked a dramatic multidimensional fracture générationnelle since the late 1970s. 12 This portrait is grim, but it is founded on strong empirical bases, on robust analyses of standards and alternative sets of microdata offering convergent results. Three principal topics will be highlighted here: first, the economic marginalization of new entrants into the labor market and its direct effects on social structure; second, the long-term consequences of this deprivation in terms of socialization and life chances; and finally, the consequences for the political participation of these cohorts, and their support for the contemporary welfare regime.
The Economic Decline of Youth
The first aspect of the dynamics of social generation formation in France is the change in the cohort distribution of economic means. A large redistribution of earnings and incomes occurred between the seventies and today. In 1970, the earning gap between age groups 25-30 and 50-59 was 18 percent; the gap has stabilized at about 50 percent for the past ten years.
During the trente glorieuses, the young wage earners generally began in the labor market with the same level of income that their own parents enjoyed at the end of a complete career. For the past twenty years, we have observed the stagnation of the wages of the young, while wages for older people have grown by 20 percent or more. Here is a new social balance between age groups, whose consequences are not completely understood by social scientists.
But it is not simply a change in the relative position of age groups: members of the elder generation (now, those at age fifty-five, more or less) were relatively advantaged in their youth when compared to their seniors, and now, too, when these seniors are compared their young successors. The generational gaps result from double gains and double pains. The unemployment rates of recent school leavers are strongly reactive to the economic situation, whereas the middle-aged and senior rates remain more stable: an economic slowdown has serious consequences for younger adults, and recovery first benefits new entrants in the labor market. Evidently, the perverse consequence of collective bargaining that leads to the protection of adults at the expense of newcomers is a lack of socialization of the new, sacrificed generations. Even if they are now adults, with dependent children of their own, their unemployment rates remain much higher, and their earnings abnormally low, when compared to other age groups, because of a kind of "scarring effect." At the end of the eighties, the unemployment rate of the group at age forty to forty-four was still about 4 percent and is now over 8 percent. This "scarring effect" is even clearer concerning earnings:
the cohorts of new entrants in the labor market in a time of downturn have to accept lower wages; conversely, for young workers, a strong economy allows them to negotiate better earnings. After this entry point, the earning gaps remain because of the lack of a catch-up effect on earnings: some generations are about 10 points above or below the long-term trend, because of the point at which they entered the workforce, and after age thirty the relative benefit or handicap remains stable. A complementary factor relates to the dynamics of occupational structure and the stratification system. In France, as in the US, the standard hypothesis of stratification change suggests that the long-term educational expansion of the twentieth century, and the emergence of a knowledge-based society, have stimulated the enlargement of the middle and uppermiddle classes. 15 Thus, the newer generation could have benefited automatically from the expansion of the occupational groups of experts, managers, or professionals (cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures) 16 to whom we often add middle management and lower professionals in the private and public sectors (such as school teachers and nurses).
These groups exemplify the "new technical middle class" whose social hegemony was predicted in the seventies (professions intermédiaires in the official French nomenclature of occupations).
The cohort analysis of the expansion of this group shows that from the cohorts born in the 1920s to those of the 1950s the share of this group increased-from 27 percent to 42 percent at age fifty, for instance. This growth is significant and substantial, but two strong nuances must be underlined. First, at age thirty-five, we notice a complete stagnation from cohort 1945 to cohort 1975. Second, the pace and slope of these transformations are much slower than in the case of mid-level diplomas, such as baccalauréat (at the end of French secondary education). From the eldest to the youngest, the share of baccalauréat owners increased from 17 percent to 60 percent of a cohort. 
Scarring Effects and Generation Dyssocialization
These transformations, then, are not simply a problem of youth, since they have permanent effects. The cohorts that are lucky enough to avoid mass unemployment and find positions they enjoy will benefit from this positive launch for their whole life, and conversely, other unlucky generations will be subjected to negative consequences of early failure that will affect their life chances. Those who are "lost in transition" do not make up for their early difficulties. 19 The assessment of the long-term impact of these early difficulties is central to this line of argument: if young, deprived generations do not catch up, a kind of long-term hysteresis effect appears, which we can call a "scar" or "scarring effect," since the handicap seems definitive and enduring. Age-period-cohort analysis shows that cohorts who experienced a difficult (favorable) entry because of a context of recession (expansion), continue to suffer (benefit) from a relative delay (advancement) in upward mobility when they are compared to the average situation. The relative position of a collective cohort at age thirty is rapidly crystallized, and there does not appear to be a substantial catch-up effect later on.
How can we explain the lack of generational catch-up? Those who had benefited from a period of entry marked by a strong demand for skilled jobs experienced faster career and earlier labor experience at higher levels of responsibility, with better wages; these individuals (and the cohort they constitute at an aggregated level) retain the long-term benefits of the early opportunities they enjoyed, which will positively influence their future trajectory at any later age. For those who entered the labor market under difficult economic conditions, the periods of unemployment they faced, the necessity to accept less qualified jobs with lower wages, and the consecutive delays in career progression, imply negative stimuli for their own trajectories (decline in ambition, lack of valued work experiences) and could appear as a negative signal for future potential employers. The hypothesis we present here for France is that cohort-specific socialization contexts imply long-term opportunities and life chances for individuals and for their cohorts; when the difficulties disappear, the cohorts who faced these problems continue to suffer from long-term consequences of past handicaps.
In more concrete terms, the cohorts born during the forties, who benefited from the economic acceleration of the late sixties, were relatively privileged compared to the previous cohorts, and were also relatively advantaged when compared to the later cohorts who did very well. 22 We now observe rising rates of downward social mobility connected to the proliferation of middle-class children who cannot find social positions comparable to those of their parents.
These diminishing resources and opportunities imply, for the newer generation, an exceptional risk of dyssocialization. sharing a risk of "oversuicidity," compared to elder generations socialized in the context of the economic expansion of the trente glorieuses. These former cohorts are still distinguished, even at age fifty or later, by low levels of suicidity, whereas the new cohorts socialized in the context of job scarcity face higher risks that increase rapidly with age.
Problems of Political Representation
Destabilization in the generational distribution of well-being is accompanied by changes in Even if, for the most part, people lack interest in politics and political matters, the variations in participation in political discussions with friends are strong, particularly when we collapse the results by age groups. In the late seventies, 25 percent of those aged thiry to thirty-four frequently engaged in political discussions with friends; that proportion had fallen to 12 percent in the late nineties. The decline is severe when we compare this generation with older age groups, notably those between fifty and fifty-five years of age, who were 21 significantly more likely to engage in political discussions when surveyed in the late nineties.
Evidently, for people at age thirty in 1977 and age fifty in 1997 (i.e., the cohorts born near 1947), political socialization occurred during the late sixties in the context of the events of May 1968 and its consequences. Since the phenomenon is not so new now-after two decades-and since this generation's lack of participation is so clearly visible in these institutions, French political leaders have become conscious of the long-term problem implied by the difficulty in attracting young members and militants. However, the effort required to change the trend is so massive that, despite the regrets expressed for the situation, nothing is done to change it.
What is the evidence? For trade-union members, the dynamic is very strong, since the socialization effect seems to be significant: for a given cohort, the percentage of trade-union members at age thirty, or even before, is a good predictor of this percentage at later ages; In terms of political prospects, we should assess the consequences, notably for the sustainability of democracy, of the decline of political socialization. The first problem is the generational transmission of democracy, which supposes a strong civil society whose absence makes the socialization of newer cohorts problematic. Participation in democracy assumes shared social knowledge, political know-how, and the ability to insert oneself into the collective networks of political bargaining. Since many institutions are led today by a homogeneous group of baby boomers who will retire at the end of the decade, and since almost nothing is done to socialize a new generation of successors, the sustainability of the political system is quite uncertain and the risk of generational micro-struggles is very high.
The second problem is a question of long-term decision making. Many weighty decisions at the national level (retirement, health, debt issues, etc.) are made by a political class whose remaining life span is generally shorter than that of the average population; the new generations that will have to face (and pay for) the long-term consequences of today's choices do not participate in the decisions made about their own future, because they are presumed to be too young (even if they are forty or older). That generational asymmetry or bias implies that many reforms are designed to have little immediate negative impact on elders and to delay payment of the costs of reform to the point that it threatens the future wellbeing of newer generations. Therefore, the social contract between generations seems to be both unclear and unstable.
Problems of Welfare Regime Sustainability
It may seem that social and structural reforms affect the entire population, whatever the age or generation. But in fact, social welfare, welfare-state dynamics, and the welfare regime 29 change with the succession of cohorts. We have to analyze this point and its consequences for social reforms and in fine the sustainability of our contemporary welfare regime. This crucial factor could show that the expensive but efficient public health and pension schemes of the present day could collapse with the future cohort replacement of older "welfare generations"
(born between 1925 and 1950) with the generations that follow.
When France's public pay-as-you-go retirement system was created in 1946, the principle was that wage earners had to participate (and work) for at least thirty years before gaining access to a full pension. Thus, in 1946, those who were thirty-five or older-that is, born before 1910-were generally excluded from the new system. Indeed, in large industries, in the public sector and in protected segments of the economy, arrangements had been developed to fulfill the contract, but most workers in smaller firms, those who had experience in agriculture or as self-employed business people, even though they were alive during the creation of this large system of welfare, were already too old to benefit from most of its outcomes: they were destined to fill the ranks of the impoverished elderly 30 during a golden age for youth. Conversely, today, the new generation leaves school at age twenty-one, loses three years in episodes of unemployment, freelance or non-standard, non-protected activities, and begins its participation in the retirement system at an average age of twenty-four. If we add forty years of contributions (the current requirement which most French seniors can meet because they could start working much earlier than the youth of today) or 46.5 years (the time requirement proposed by the French employers union), we discover that our present system of early retirement (at an average age of fifty-eight, with an average level of income close to the employed population) is simply inaccessible for the newcomers. In the most probable scenario, the generations of pensioners to come will not benefit from the generosity of the current system, even if they contribute heavily to the high level of protection that benefits today's seniors. This point is even clearer when we analyze how the lower half or third (in educational terms) of the young generation, which has to wait for years before obtaining a stable position, is socialized within the working world and the political and welfare system.
We now socialize the young within a much more unequal system than in the early seventies, and the greater inequalities within today's younger generation will have consequences for their future trajectory.
Some optimistic observers of these trends argue that with a long-term annual rate of growth of about 2 percent, the retirement system will eventually balance itself out. Moreover, when the baby-boom generation begins to retire, a process already underway since 2007, new jobs will be available for the younger generation. However, the risk is double here: on the one hand, perhaps we overestimate the number of new positions that will be created, since 30 In 1959, when a minimum income for old people was created (one third of the minimum wage of that age), it covered more than 50 percent of those 65 years and older; nowadays, this minimum income is about two-thirds of the present minimum wage, but covers 8 percent of the same age group, since the currently generous public pay-as-you-go scheme covers almost anyone. Before, the old age groups were poor and unequal, but now they are comparable to the active population in terms of average income and of standard deviation.
